Abstract. We rst present two tight lower bounds on the size of the secret keys of each user in an unconditionally secure one-time use broadcast encryption scheme (OTBES). Then we show how to construct a computationally secure multiple-use broadcast encryption scheme (MBES) from a key predistribution scheme (KPS) by using the ElGamal cryptosystem. We prove that our MBES is secure against chosen (message, privileged subset of users) attacks if the ElGamal cryptosystem is secure and if the original KPS is simulatable. This is the rst MBES whose security is proved formally.
Introduction
Secure broadcast encryption is one of the central problems in communication and network security. In this paper we link One-Time use Broadcast Encryption Schemes (OTBESs) 5, 7, 6] with Key Predistribution Schemes (KPS) 10]. Both schemes are closely related but they have a di erent structure. In a KPS, a Trusted Authority (TA) distributes secret information to a set of users such that, each member of a privileged subset P of users can compute a speci ed key k P , but no coalition F (forbidden subset) is able to recover any information on the key k P that it is not supposed to know. In a OTBES, the TA distributes secret information to a set of users and then broadcasts a ciphertext b P over a network. The secret information is such that each member of a particular subset P of users can decrypt b P , but no coalition F (forbidden subset) is able to recover any information on the plaintext m P of b P that it is not supposed to know.
A natural way to construct an OTBES from a KPS is to use a key k P of the KPS to encrypt the message m P , that is b P = k P + m P : (1) ? A part of this research has been supported by NSF Grant NCR-9508528.
Stinson et al. 4, 6] have shown that there is a tradeo between jB P j and jU i j in
OTBESs, where B P is the set of ciphertexts b P and U i is the set of secrets of user i. That is, jB P j can be decreased by increasing jU i j and vice versa. A (P; F)-KPS is a KPS for which P 4 = fP j P is a privileged subsetg and F 4 = fF j F is a forbidden subsetg. In particular, { A (t; w)-KPS is a (P; F)-KPS with P = fP j jPj = tg, F = fF j jFj wg, { A ( n; w)-KPS is a (P; F)-KPS with P = 2 U , F = fF j jFj wg, where U is the set of users and n 4 = jUj. We de ne (P; F)-OTBESs, (t; w)-OTBESs and ( n; w)-OTBESs in a similar way. Below we list some of the known KPSs and OTBESs.
Key Predistribution Schemes. Blom 9] . This can be considered as a complement of the Fiat and Naor ( n; n)-KPS.
In this paper, we rst prove that a (P; F)-KPS is equivalent to a (P; F)-OTBES when jB P j = jMj, where M denotes the set of messages (Theorems 1, 2). Then, by using the bounds in 3, 2] for KPSs we get directly a lower bound on jU i j for ( n; w)-OTBESs and a lower bound for (t; w)-OTBESs. The former is the rst lower bound for ( n; w)-OTBESs. The latter is more tight than the bound of Blundo, Frota Mattos and Stinson for jB P j = jMj. Both bounds are tight because the natural schemes which use equation (1) meet the equalities of our bounds. We also present a general lower bound on jU i j for KPSs which includes all the previous known bounds as special cases (Theorem 3).
Next, we show how to construct a computationally secure (P; F)-Multiple use Broadcast Encryption Scheme ((P; F)-MBES) from a (P; F)-KPS by using the ElGamal cryptosystem. We prove (Theorem 4) that our (P; F)-MBES is secure against chosen (message, privileged subset of users) attacks (De nition 1) if the ElGamal cryptosystem is secure and if the original (P; F)-KPS is simulatable (De nition 3).
We then show that the Blundo et al. scheme, the Fiat-Naor scheme and the Desmedt-Viswanathan scheme are all simulatable (Theorems 5,6). By combining 1 The model for broadcast encryption in 2, 5] corresponds to our model for KPSs. So, for example, the bounds in 2] hold only for KPSs, and not for OTBESs.
this result with our earlier construction we get (P; F)-MBESs for (P; F) = (t; w) and ( n; w) whose security is proven formally.
The proposed construction is the rst MBES whose security is proven formally (Corollary 6). Furthermore, our technique can be generalized to many of the OTBESs in 6], and our argument holds for Multiple use (P; F)-KPSs.
2 Mathematical models 4, 6] Our model for key distribution and broadcast encryption consists of a Trusted Authority (TA) and a set of users U = f1; 2; : : :; ng.
Key predistribution
In a key pre-distribution scheme, the TA generates and distributes secret information to each user. The information given to user i is denoted by u i and must be distributed \o -band" (i.e., not using the network) in a secure manner. This secret information will enable various privileged subsets to compute keys.
Let 2 U denote the set of all subsets of users. P 2 U will denote the collection of all privileged subsets to which the TA distributes keys. F 2 U will denote the collection of all possible coalitions (called forbidden subsets) against which each key is to remain secure.
Once the secret information is distributed, each user i in a privileged set P should be able to compute the key k P associated with P. On the other hand, no forbidden set F 2 F disjoint from P should be able to compute any information about k P .
Let K P denote the set of possible keys associated with P. We assume that K P = K for each P 2 P. U ij , where X = fi 1 ; : : : ; i j g and i 1 < < i j . We assume that there is a probability distribution on U U , and that the TA chooses u U 2 U U according to this probability distribution. We say that the scheme is a (P; F)-Key Predistribution Scheme ((P; F)-KPS) if the following conditions are satis ed:
1. Each user i in any privileged set P can compute k P : 8i 2 P, 8P 2 P, 8u i 2 U i , 9k P 2 K P s.t.,
2. No forbidden subset F disjoint from any privileged subset P has any information on k P :
We denote a (P; F)-KPS by (U 1 ; : : : ; U n ; K).
One-time Broadcast Encryption
We will use the notation from Section 2.1. We assume that the network is a broadcast channel, i.e., it is insecure, and that any information transmitted by the TA will be received by every user.
In a set-up stage, the TA generates and distributes secret information u i to each user i o -band. At a later time, the TA will want to broadcast a message to a privileged subset P. The particular privileged subset P is, in general, not known ahead of time.
P 2 U will denote the collection of all privileged subsets to which the TA might want to broadcast a message. F 2 U will denote the collection of all possible coalitions (forbidden subsets) against which a broadcast is to remain secure. Now, suppose that the TA wants to broadcast a message to a given privileged set P 2 P at a later time. (The particular privileged set P is not known when the scheme is set up, except for the restriction that P 2 P.) Let M P denote the set of possible messages that might be broadcast to P. We assume that M P = M for each P 2 P. Furthermore, we assume that there is a probability distribution on M, and that the TA chooses a message (i.e., a plaintext) m P 2 M according to this probability distribution. Then the broadcast b P (which is an element of a speci ed set B P ) is computed as a function of m P and u P .
Once b P is broadcast, each user i 2 P should be able to decrypt b P and obtain m P . On the other hand, no forbidden set F 2 F disjoint from P should be able to compute any information about m P .
The security of the scheme is in terms of a single broadcast, so we call the scheme one-time. We say that the scheme is a (P; F)-One-Time Broadcast Encryption Scheme ((P; F)-OTBES) if the following conditions are satis ed:
Conventional notation
We rst consider key predistribution schemes. If P consists of all t-subsets of U, then we will write (t; F)-KPS. Similarly, if P consists of all subsets of U of size at most t, we write ( t; F)-KPS. An analogous notation will be used for F.
Thus, for example, a ( n; 1)-KPS is a KPS for which there is a key associated with any subset of users (i.e., P = 2 U ) and no key k P can be computed by any individual user i 6 2 P. Note that in any (P; F)-KPS, if F 2 F and F 0 F, then F 0 2 F. Hence, a (P; w)-KPS is a (P; w)-KPS.
The same notation is used for one-time use broadcast encryption schemes.
Known results
For a random variable X, H(X) denotes the entropy of X. Generally, 0 H(X) log 2 jXj; where X 4 = fx j Pr(X = x) > 0g: In particular, H(X) = log 2 jXj i X is uniformly distributed. where, a i1 it = a (i1 it) for any permutation on (i 1 ; : : : ; i t ). The TA computes u i as u i = f(i; x 2 ; : : : ; x t ) and gives u i to user i secretly for 1 i n. The key associated with the t-subset P = fi 1 ; : : : ; i t g is k P = f(i 1 ; : : : ; i t ). Each user j 2 P can compute k P from u j easily. In this scheme, jK P j = q = jKj and log jU i j = t + w ? 3.2 A ( n; w)-KPS (The Fiat-Naor scheme) Fiat and Naor presented the following ( n; w)-KPS 5]. Let q be any positive integer. For every subset F U of cardinality at most w, the TA chooses a random value s F 2 Z q and gives s F to every member of U n F as the secret information. Then the key associated with a privileged set P is de ned to be
Here is a small example for illustration. Take n = 3, q = 17 and w = 1, and suppose that the TA chooses the values, s ; = 11; s f1g = 8; s f2g = 3; s f3g = 8:
The secret information of the users is, u 1 = fs ; ; s f2g ; s f3g g; u 2 = fs ; ; s f1g ; s f3g g; u 3 = fs ; ; s f1g ; s f2g g:
The keys determined by this information are, k f1;2g = s ; + s f3g = 2 mod 17; : : : ; k f1;2;3g = s ; = 11 mod 17:
In this scheme, jK P j = q = jKj and log jU i j = 3.3 The ( n; n)-KPS (The Desmedt-Viswanathan scheme) Desmedt and Viswanathan presented a ( n; n)-KPS 9]. This scheme can viewed as a complement of the Fiat-Naor ( n; n)-KPS. The TA initially generates 2 n ? n ? 1 independent keys, i.e., one for each P f1; 2; : : :; ng such that jPj 2. Each user i receives from the TA the keys of those subsets for which i 2 P. Hence, each user gets 2 n?1 ? 1 keys. This scheme is optimum because of the following lower bound which follows from Corollary 1.
Corollary 2. In a ( n; n)-KPS, log jU i j ( 4 New lower bounds on jU i j
In this section we rst prove that a (P; F)-KPS is equivalent to a (P; F)-OTBES when jB P j = jMj. Then, by using the bounds in 3, 2] for KPSs, we get directly a lower bound on jU i j for ( n; w)-OTBESs and a lower bound for (t; w)-OTBESs. The former is the rst lower bound presented for ( n; w)-OTBESs.
The latter is more tight than the bound of Blundo, Mattos and Stinson for jB P j = jMj. Our bounds are both tight. We also present a general lower bound on jU i j for KPSs which includes all the previous bounds as special cases.
Equivalence between KPS and OTBES Theorem 1. If there exists a (P; F)-KPS (U 1 ;
: : : ; U n ; K), then there exists a (P; F)-OTBES (U 1 ; : : : ; U n ; M; fB P g) with jB P j = jMj = jKj for all P 2 P. Proof. Use a key k P of the (P; F)-KPS to encrypt a message m P , that is b P = k P + m P ;
and broadcast b P . We then get a (P; F)-OTBES. u t Theorem 2. If there exists a (P; F)-OTBES (U 1 ; : : : ; U n ; M; fB P g) such that jB P j = jMj for all P 2 P, then there exists a (P; F)-KPS (U 1 ; : : : ; U n ; K) such that jKj = jMj and H(K) = H(M). Proof . From a (P; F)-OTBES construct a KPS as follows. Fix b P 2 B P arbitrarily for all P 2 P. Since jB P j = jMj, there is a bijection from B P to M for any (u 1 ; : : : ; u n ). Then there is anm P 2 M such that each member of P decrypts the b P asm P for any (u 1 ; : : : ; u n ). Now take k P =m P in our KPS. It is easy to see that we get a (P; F)-KPS with jKj = jMj and H(K) = H(M The proof is given in Appendix. Note that Proposition 3 is also obtained as a corollary from Theorem 3. Indeed, all the previous bounds for KPSs are obtained as corollaries to Theorem 3.
From Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 5. In a (P; F)-OTBES, if jB P j = jMj for all P 2 P, then log jU i j i log jMj; where i = jfP j i 2 P 2 P ; f1; 2; : : :; ngnP 2 Fgj:
In this section we rst show how to construct a computationally secure (P; F)-Multiple use Broadcast Encryption Scheme ((P; F)-MBES) from a (P; F)-KPS by using the ElGamal cryptosystem. We then prove that our (P; F)-MBES is secure against chosen (message, privileged subset of users) attacks if the ElGamal cryptosystem is secure and if the original (P; F)-KPS is simulatable. We also show that all the KPSs considered in Section 3 are simulatable. This construction is the rst (P; F)-MBES whose security is proved formally. Furthermore, our technique can be generalized to many of the OTBES presented in 6].
A proposed construction for (P; F)-MBES
Let (U 1 ; : : : ; U n ; K) be a (P; F)-KPS. The TA distributes secret information u 1 ; : : : ; u n to the users in the same way as for the (P; F)-KPS. Let Q be a prime power such that jKj j Q ? 1. Let g be a primitive jKj-th root of unity over GF(Q). All the participants agree on Q and g. Let where k P is the key of the (P; F)-KPS for P and r is a random number. Each member of P can decrypt b P by using k P with the ElGamal cryptosystem.
Security
Let u F be a u F 2 U F with Pr(U F = u F ) > 0. We will show that the proposed construction is secure against chosen message attacks, in which the adversary can target privileged subsets of users adaptively. Informally these attacks are de ned as follows. Fix a forbidden subset F (under the control of the adversary) arbitrarily. Suppose that F has obtained a broadcast b P of a privileged subset P, P \ F = ;. Then F chooses several privileged subsets P i and messages m Pi adaptively, and can obtain from the TA, by using it as an oracle, the broadcast Q; g;F 2 F; uF ;P 2 P; bP = (g r ; mP g rkP ) withF \P = ;. A 0 then chooses P i 2 P and m i 2 M adaptively, and sends these to the TA as a query for i = 1; 2; : : :; l. The TA gives back b Pi = (g ri ; m Pi g rikP i ) to A 0 . Finally, A 0 outputs mP with non-negligble probability for all (F ;P).
De nition 2. We say that the ElGamal cryptosystem is secure if there is no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A 1 which on input (Q; g; y; g r ; my r ) outputs m with non-negligible probability, where r is a random number and y 2 hgi. De nition 3. We say that a (P; F)-KPS is simulatable if there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm (the simulator) B for which the following holds. On input (Q; g; y; P 2 P;F 2 F) with P \F = ;, B outputs uF , g kP 1 ; : : : ; g kP h with probability Pr(K P1 = k P1 ; : : : ; K P h = k P h ; uF = uF j K P = k P ); where y = g kP and fP 1 ; : : : ; P h g = fP i j P i 2 P; P i 6 = P; P i \F = ;g. Theorem 4. Suppose that a (P; F)-KPS is simulatable. Then the (P; F)-MBES obtained by using this KPS in our construction is secure against chosen (message, privileged subset of users) attacks if the ElGamal cryptosystem is secure.
Proof. Suppose that a (P; F)-KPS is simulatable and that the proposed (P; F)-MBES is not secure against chosen (message, privileged subset of users) attacks.
Then there is a simulator B for the (P; F)-KPS, and an adversary A 0 which breaks bP forP 2 P by controllingF 2 F for someP \F = ;.
We will describe a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A 1 which breaks the ElGamal cryptosystem by using A 0 and B as subroutines. Let the input to A 1 be (Q; g; y; g r ; my r ). Then there is a kP such that y = g kP . A 1 works as follows. Proof. We give a proof for the Fiat-Naor scheme. The proof for the DesmedtViswanathan scheme is obtained in a similar way.
We shall describe a simulator B whose input is (Q; g; y; P;F), where has the formâ i1 it = i1 it + i1 it c; (7) for some constants i1 it and i1 it . Then from eq.(6), we have k P = f c (v 1 ; : : : ; v t ) = e 0 + e 1 c for some constants e 0 and e 1 . This means that there exists such an f c . Now y = g kP = g e0 (g c ) e1 : Then g c = (y=g e0 ) 1=e1 . Therefore B can compute fg^a i 1 i t g from equation (7). Finally B can compute g kP i for all P i 2 P by using equation (6) and fg^a i 1 i t g. u t Corollary 6. Suppose that the ElGamal cryptosystem is secure. The MBESs obtained from the Blundo et al. scheme, the Fiat-Naor scheme and the DesmedtViswanathan scheme by using our construction, are all secure against chosen (message, privileged subset of users) attacks.
Generalization of our MBES
We can generalize the MBESs in Corollary 6 so that anyone can do broadcast encryption. In the Fiat-Naor based MBES, make each g sF public. In the Blundo et al. based MBES, make each g ai public, where a i is the coe cient of the symmetric polynomial f. Finally in the Desmedt-Viswanathan based MBES, make each g kP public. It can be proved that these modi cations maintain the security. The details will be given in the nal paper. Therefore, F = f1; 2; : : :; ng n P: This means that P = Q = f1; 2; : : :; ng n P. This is a contradiction. Hence, F \ P 6 = ;. u t Proof of Theorem 3 For simplicity, we give a proof for jU 1 j. Takẽ P 4 = fP j 1 2 P 2 P ; f1; 2; : : :; ngnP 2 Fg: Let l = 1 = jPj and letP = fP 1 ; P 2 ; : : : ; P l g, where jP 1 j jP 2 j jP l j.
Let u = (u 1 ; : : : ; u n ) be a vector of secret information of the users such that Pr U U = u] > 0:
We de ne u F similarly.
For all k 1 2 K P1 , for all F such that P 1 \ F 1 = ; and for all u F , Pr K P1 = k 1 j U F = u F ] = Pr K P1 = k 1 ] > 0; from equation (2) . Therefore, for all k 1 2 K P1 there is a u = (u 1 ; : : : ; u n ) such that the key of P 1 reconstructed from u is k 1 . Now let k = (k 1 ; : : : ; k l ) be any vector in K P1 K P l . We claim that there is a u such that the key of P i reconstructed from u is k i for 1 i l.
Suppose that our claim is false. Let h( l) be the maximum index such that However, this is against eq.(2).
Hence, for any k 2 K P1 K P l , there exists a u such that the keys are k. Remember that user 1 is included in any P i from our de nition ofP . It follows that u i must be distinct for each k. Therefore, jU 1 j jK P1 j jK P l j = jKj l :
Hence, log jU 1 j l log jKj = 1 log jKj:
